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ABSTRACT 
We study the dual relationship between market structure and prices and between 
market structure and investment in mobile telecommunications. Using a uniquely 
constructed panel of mobile operators’ prices and accounting information across 33 
OECD countries between 2002 and 2014, we document that more concentrated markets 
lead to higher end user prices. Furthermore, they also lead to higher investment per 
mobile operator, though the impact on total investment is not conclusive. Our findings 
are not only relevant for the current consolidation wave in the telecommunications 
industry. More generally, they stress that competition and regulatory authorities should 
take seriously the potential trade-off between market power effects and efficiency gains 
stemming from agreements between firms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Europe is experiencing a wave of merger activity in the telecommunications industry 
that may lead to a consolidation of the EU’s telecommunications market. In mobile 
telecommunications, in particular, the European Commission has recently cleared 4-to-3 
mergers in the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland and Germany but its concerns regarding the 
impact on prices and competition have prevented a similar merger in Denmark in 2015. 
Another 4-to-3 merger in the UK was blocked in 2016, and yet another proposed merger 
in Italy has recently been approved by the European Commission (subject to a 
divestiture requirement). Earlier decisions had dealt with, and approved, 5-to-4 mergers 
in Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The debate extends beyond 
Europe. A 4-to-3 merger in Australia was approved in 2009. In the US, the federal 
regulator (FCC) blocked a merger between AT&T and T-Mobile in 2009 and then 
indicated that it would not allow a merger between T-Mobile and Sprint in 2014. The 
latter deal may be reignited soon due to further changes in the US telecoms competitive 
landscape.  
These mergers have been discussed in the context of considerable debate regarding the 
relationship between market structure and market performance. Competition and 
regulatory authorities typically focus on the pricing implications of mergers, as they are 
concerned that increased concentration comes with higher prices for end users. However, 
authorities seem to have paid less attention to the impact that such mergers could have 
on efficiencies, and, especially, investments. Mobile operators argue that their revenues 
continue to decline due to increasing competition from global Internet players, such as 
Skype and WhatsApp, offering alternative services. At the same time, operators argue 
that they are investing large sums into their broadband networks to meet the demand for 
data traffic. Consolidation, via mergers, is for them an attempt to maintain profitability 
levels and keep up with investments. 
This debate is particularly prominent in the European Union, as the completion of the 
Digital Single Market (DSM) is one of the top priorities for the European Commission. 
In 2015, the Commission published a strategy outlining how it intends to achieve that 
goal, stating that the completion of the DSM “could contribute €415 billion per year to 
[the EU] economy and create 3.8 million jobs”.1 A pillar of the strategy is addressing 
“fragmentation” in the telecoms sector, and the resulting smaller scale of operation. 
While fragmentation has been identified as one of the factors behind the worse financial 
results of European telecoms companies compared to their US, Japanese and Korean 
counterparts, it has also been interpreted differently by different stakeholders. For the 
Commission, fragmentation relates to access availability, quality and prices that vary 
significantly across the continent, with telecoms markets defined by national borders. 
Mobile operators, instead, point to the fact that there are about 40 mobile network 
operators in the EU. Many operate in just one or two countries.2 By comparison, in the 
                                                          
1 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/. See Mariniello and Salemi (2015). 
2 A restricted group of big international companies (Vodafone, Deutsche Telecom, Telia-Sonera, Orange, Hutchison) have a 
larger European footprint. 
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US there are four nationwide mobile operators (AT&T, Verizon, Sprint and T-Mobile).3 
While the Commission would seem to be lenient in case there were cross-border 
mergers, the mobile operators appear more interested in achieving within-country 
consolidation. 
In this paper we study the relationship between prices, investments, and market 
structure in the mobile telecommunications industry. We use an empirical approach by 
looking at the experience of thirty-three countries in the period 2002-2014. We collect 
what is, to our knowledge, the largest dataset employed to-date for works of this kind. A 
challenge in assembling a panel dataset like ours is to find relevant and comparable 
information at the operator level, between countries and over time. The dataset spans a 
time period long enough to capture changes in market structure: entry via licensing, exit 
via mergers and organic growth through changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration index. This provides ideal variation in the data to assess how market 
structure impacts on prices and investments, holding other factors constant. Our panel 
data approach includes fixed effects to control for systematic differences between 
countries and general changes over time, and instrumental variables for the remaining 
endogeneity related to some of the variables used to proxy market concentration. While 
the variation in market structure over time is not only due to mergers, but also due to 
new entry and organic growth, we focus our conclusions mainly on the impact of 
mergers because this has recently received considerable policy attention. 
We find that an increase in market concentration in the mobile industry can potentially 
generate an important trade-off. While a merger will increase prices, investment per 
operator will also go up. Based on our estimates, a hypothetical 4-to-3 symmetric merger 
would increase the bill of end users by 16.3% on average. At the same time investment 
per operator significantly increases by 19.3%, while total industry investment does not 
change significantly. Our evidence on the impact of concentration on total industry 
investment is therefore not entirely conclusive. On the one hand, it suggests that 
efficiencies are present, since theoretical models predict that total investment would 
decrease in the absence of efficiencies. But on the other hand, it is not clear whether 
efficiencies from coordinating total industry investment among fewer firms only stem 
from fixed costs savings, or whether they also involve marginal cost savings and quality 
improvements that benefit consumers. To shed further light on this, additional research is 
necessary with more complete data on the underlying investment components of all 
operators, or based on more in-depth individual case studies. 
Our findings are not only relevant for the current consolidation wave in the 
telecommunications industry. More generally, they also stress that competition and 
regulatory authorities should take seriously the potential trade-off between market power 
effects and efficiency gains stemming from agreements between firms.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows. In Section 2 we relate our work to the 
existing literature, especially to price-concentration and investment-concentration 
studies. Section 3 describes how we matched different sources to construct the dataset. 
                                                          
3 The US, however, also has one multi-regional operator (US Cellular) and several regional and local providers that can be 
large in size. 
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Section 4 motivates our empirical strategy to identify the causal relationship between 
market structure on the one hand, and prices and investments on the other hand. Section 
5 presents the main results, while in Section 6 we conduct a detailed robustness analysis 
and several extensions. The limitations of our approach are discussed in Section 7. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE 
This paper is related to several streams in the literature. First and foremost, we belong to 
a long tradition in Industrial Organisation that has studied the relationship between 
market structure and performance, typically proxied by profits and/or prices. Second, we 
are interested in the important link between market structure and investments, which is 
part of a much larger field that has studied innovation and market structure. Third, we 
are specifically interested in conducting an empirical study related to the mobile 
telecommunications industry, an important and dynamic industry and an active field of 
research. Finally, we contribute to work on the trade-off between market power and 
efficiency gains from mergers. 
2.1. Literature on market structure and performance 
A long stream of papers in economics examines the relationship between competitive 
features of a market and profitability. In the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of 
Industrial Organisation, this literature relies on cross-sectional data across industries to 
provide evidence on the impact of concentration on profitability. A general finding in 
this literature is that higher market shares and increased supplier concentration are 
associated with higher profitability (see for example, Schmalensee, 1989). The profit-
concentration studies have been criticised on several grounds. First, these studies are 
afflicted by measurement problems as accounting profits are poor indicators of economic 
profits. Second, the cross-sectional data from different industries used in these works is 
challenging due to large differences in demand and supply conditions across industries. 
Finally, these studies are subject to the “efficiency” critique offered by Demsetz (1973), 
who argued that the positive correlation between profits and market concentration could 
be due to the superiority of a few firms. 
Over the past several decades, the profit-concentration studies have been replaced by 
related research that examines the relationship between market structure and prices, 
rather than profits. An advantage of using prices as opposed to profits is that they are not 
subject to accounting conventions, and they may be easier to obtain, often at a more 
detailed level of individual products sold by the firms. Weiss (1989) provides a 
collection of a large number of price-concentration studies and argues that, since prices 
are determined in the market, they are not subject to Demsetz’s critique. Furthermore, 
the majority of the price-concentration studies use data across local markets within an 
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industry, rather than across industries, making comparisons easier. These studies include 
a wide range of industries such as groceries (Cotterill, 1986), banking (Calem and 
Carlino, 1991), airlines (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), driving lessons (Asplund and 
Sandin, 1999), movie theatres (Davis, 2005), and the beer industry (Ashenfelter et al., 
2015), to name just a few examples. Several studies have used price-concentration 
analysis to evaluate the effect of actual mergers on prices, for example in airlines 
(Borenstein, 1990; Kim and Singal, 1993), banking (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003), 
petroleum (Hastings, 2004; Gilbert and Hastings, 2005; Hosken et al., 2011), and 
appliances (Ashenfelter et al., 2013). 
A general finding in this price-concentration literature is that high concentration is 
associated with higher prices (Weiss, 1989; see also a more recent survey by Newmark, 
2004). However, as pointed out by both Bresnahan (1989) and Schmalensee (1989) in 
their chapters in the Handbook of Industrial Organization, the price-concentration 
regressions, such as those used in the literature, suffer from endogeneity issues. In 
particular, there might be unobserved demand and cost shocks in a market that not only 
influence prices but also the underlying market structure. For instance, a market with 
unobserved high costs is likely to have higher prices, but these markets are also likely to 
attract fewer entrants. Evans et al. (1993) address this issue and propose a combination 
of fixed effects and instrumental variable procedures that are applicable when one has 
access to panel data, as we do. They study the price-concentration relationship in the 
airline industry and find that the effect of concentration on price is severely biased using 
OLS procedures. 
As Whinston (2008) points out, price-concentration analysis is one of the most 
commonly used econometric techniques employed by competition authorities when 
analysing horizontal mergers. Similarly, Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) note that “reduced 
form price equations are the workhorse empirical methods for antitrust litigation”.4 The 
bias in the parameters capturing market structure and competitive interactions can 
therefore have important policy implications. 
2.2. Literature on competition and innovation/investment 
There is a broad on the relationship between competition and innovation (see Nickell, 
1996; Aghion et al., 2005; Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion and Griffith 2006; Acemoglu 
and Akcigit, 2012). The existing empirical studies on this subject face the issue that the 
relationship between competition and innovation is endogenous, i.e., market structure 
may not only affect innovation but the reverse is also possible (Jaffe, 2000; Hall and 
Harho, 2012). We take advantage of two features in our data. First, changes in 
competition due to mergers occurred at different points in time across countries, or did 
not occur at all in other countries. This enables us to conduct a difference in differences 
                                                          
4 A main alternative empirical method in antitrust is the structural approach, which starts by estimating own- and cross-price 
elasticities (or diversion ratios and markups) and then uses these parameters in an oligopoly model to measure the likely 
competitive effects of mergers. See, e.g., Werden and Froeb (1994) and Hausman et al. (1994) for a development of so-called 
merger simulation models, and Peters (2006) or Björnerstedt and Verboven (2015) for evaluations of their performance. 
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analysis. Second, various regulatory interventions affected both entry and growth in the 
telecommunications market (see later the discussion on termination rate regulation). This 
allows us to construct instrumental variables that address remaining endogeneity 
concerns regarding our competition measure. 
While the literature cited above is empirical, we note that there are also several 
theoretical works that study the relationship between competition and innovation (or 
investments). In the absence of spill-overs, Vives (2008) finds that investment per firm 
tends to decrease as the number of firms in a market increases,5 while industry 
investment tends to increase as the number of firms increases. Schmutzler (2013) 
extends Vives’ model to an asymmetric setting and shows that the opposite result can 
hold true in the presence of a firm that is particularly efficient. Summarising the 
literature, Gilbert (2006) concludes that – broadly speaking – competition produces 
greater innovation incentives under exclusive rights to innovation, while non-exclusive 
rights generally lead to the opposite conclusion. We also observe that there is a 
surprisingly limited body of theoretical work specifically on the impact of mergers on 
innovation, with recent contributions by Motta and Tarantino (2016) and Marshall and 
Parra (2016) being notable exceptions. In particular, Motta and Tarantino (2016) find 
that in the absence of economies of scope, mergers reduce total industry investment. 
2.3. Literature on the mobile telecommunications industry 
Work more specific to the mobile telecommunications industry has investigated 
several related questions. Some papers have studied the early stages of diffusion and 
focused on technology ‘generations’ (e.g., 1G/2G/3G), industry standards, and entry 
regulation (see, e.g., Gruber and Verboven, 2001a,b; Liikanen et al., 2004; Koski and 
Kretschmer, 2005; and Grajeck and Kretschmer, 2009). Typically, these works do not 
explicitly address the question of the impact of market structure on diffusion. An 
exception is Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b) who include a duopoly dummy variable 
which they find to be statistically significant but quantitatively small. Liikanen et al. 
(2004) include two market structure variables: the number of firms and a 3-firm 
Herfindahl index; neither is found to be statistically significant. A limitation of these 
papers is that they refer to data from the 90s, which were still quite early in the diffusion 
process. Using more recent data, but following the same spirit of looking at the process 
of mobile diffusion, Li and Lyons (2012) find that both the number of networks, and the 
history of market structure, matter for the speed of consumer uptake. This market 
structure effect does not work only through the level of prices. Digital technology, 
standardisation, privatisation and independent regulation are also important positive 
factors in their study.6 
                                                          
5 On the one hand an increase in the number of firms reduces residual demand, which reduces investment incentives. On the 
other hand, an increase in the number of firms also increases the price elasticity, which increases investment incentives. Vives’ 
finds that the first effect dominates the second, so that investment per firm decreases. 
6 There is also literature that has looked at a different range of issues in the mobile industry, such as optimal contracts 
(Miravete, 2002), consumer inertia (Miravete and Palacios-Huerta, 2014), as well as competitive dynamics and the impact of 
regulation (Seim and Viard, 2011; Genakos and Valletti, 2011 and 2015). 
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To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any published academic study that 
relates market structure to investments in the mobile telecommunications industry. 
While some policy reports exist (e.g., OECD, 2014; Frontier Economics, 2015; HSBC, 
2015), the academic literature so far has investigated investment matters only in the 
fixed telecommunications industry, where the focus is, however, typically different. A 
key question in fixed telecommunications, which is however less central in mobile 
telecommunications, is one-way access of new entrants to the infrastructure of the 
incumbent fixed-line operator (see, e.g., Greenstein and Mazzeo, 2006; Economides et 
al. 2008; Xiao and Orazem, 2009, 2011; Grajek and Roeller, 2012; and Nardotto et al., 
2015). 
2.4. Market power and efficiency gains from mergers 
In an influential article, Williamson (1968) argued that mergers only need small 
efficiency gains to compensate for market power effects from mergers. Most competition 
authorities have however followed a consumer surplus standard, emphasizing that (i) 
efficiencies should consist of marginal cost savings in order to be passed on into 
consumer prices; and (ii) efficiencies should be merger-specific, i.e., could not have 
occurred in the absence of the merger (see the Guidelines of the European Commission 
(2004) and for an earlier review Röller, Stennek and Verboven (2001). 
There is very little empirical work that explicitly examines the trade-off between 
market power and efficiency gains from increases in concentration, whether from a 
welfare or from a consumer surplus perspective. One notable exceptions is Focarelli and 
Panetta (2003). They find that mergers in the Italian banking sector benefited consumers 
as they raised consumer deposit rates in the long run, and they attribute this to cost 
savings.7 And, more recently, Ashenfelter et al. (2105) find that the increase in 
concentration in the US brewing industry due to the merger between the second and third 
largest firms in the industry led to an increase in pricing that was nearly exactly offset by 
efficiencies created by the merger. 
Our study on the impact of concentration on both prices and investment can shed 
further light on the trade-off between market power and efficiency gains from increased 
concentration. We cannot do this directly, as we do not observe efficiency gains. 
Nevertheless, our information on investment provides indirect evidence, which we can 
interpret based on theoretical work by, for example, Vives (2008) and Motta and 
Tarantino (2016).  In particular, these analyses imply that, if mergers do not reduce 
industry investment, then they most involve efficiencies. Such efficiencies may stem 
from simply saving duplicated fixed costs (in which case it benefits welfare but not 
consumers). But they may also come from other benefits of coordinating investment 
within a firm, such as marginal cost savings or quality improvements. Whether such 
                                                          
7 One should note that the Italian banking industry is rather fragmented, and mergers happened at concentration levels that 
typically would not raise concerns from antitrust authorities. 
EVALUATING MOBILE CONSOLIDATION 
 
8 
benefits are in the interest of consumers is a question we will not be able to address with 
our analysis. 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND MARKET TRENDS 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the link between measures of market concentration, 
tariffs paid by end users, and investments carried out by mobile operators.  
3.1. Data description 
We focus on a large panel of OECD countries over the period 2002-2014. We combine 
data on prices of mobile baskets and operators’ market shares, with information on their 
investments and profitability as well as information on the interconnection prices 
(termination rates) operators pay to each other for termination of calls. 
We matched three different data sources for our analysis that we now describe. 
3.1.1. Prices  
We used Teligen to obtain quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers 
across operators and countries (2002Q3-2014Q2). Teligen collects and compares all 
available tariffs of the two largest mobile operators for thirty-four OECD countries. 
Teligen constructs different consumer usage profiles (e.g., large, medium and low users) 
based on the number of calls and messages, the average call length and the time and type 
of call.8 A distinction between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) prices 
is also accounted for, as this is an important industry characteristic. These consumer 
profiles are then held fixed when looking across countries and time.  
Several remarks on the methodology are in order. First, the prices used are not actual 
bills, but hypothetical bills representing the consumers’ best choice for that usage 
profile. Empirical work with actual billing data has shown that in practice consumers do 
not always choose their best tariff plan, but they do not necessarily make permanent 
mistakes (see Miravete, 2003, and Miravete and Palacios-Huerta, 2014, who establish 
this after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of past choices).  
Second, the Teligen dataset only reports tariff data, and does not provide information 
on implicit discounts from subsidized handsets in the case of post-paid contract prices. 
Handset subsidies were especially common during the 90s, but less so after 2005. To the 
extent that these deals were still common across operators within a country, their effect 
would be captured by the country and time fixed effects. Moreover, there is no reason to 
expect that handset subsidies changed particularly due to mergers. We verified our 
results using different subsamples (after 2006 and 2010) indicating the results are robust 
to these perturbations. We also did a sensitivity analysis by looking at pre-paid and post-
                                                          
8 The 2010 and 2012 Teligen revision of profiles includes more than three customer profiles. For consistency we selected three 
profiles that still correspond to large, medium and low users. 
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paid separately, as pre-paid tariffs are not likely to be affected in any significant fashion 
by handset subsidies. This gave similar conclusions though the standard errors increase 
due to the reduced number of observations. 
Third, while it is common to use fixed consumer profiles or consumption baskets to 
compare prices, it is subject to several related biases, relating to substitution, quality 
improvements and new product introduction. See, for example, Hausman (2003) for a 
discussion. Our approach to this issue has been to perform a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to alternative baskets, as discussed below. 
The Teligen dataset has three main advantages. First, the information reported is about 
consumers’ monthly bills, contrary to other metrics (such as average revenue per user) 
that confound several sources of revenues for the operator paid by different parties. 
Second, by fixing a priori the calling profiles of customers, it provides us with 
information on the best choices of these customers across countries and time, and 
accounts for possible heterogeneity in the calling profiles. Third, the prices reported in 
this dataset include much of the relevant information for this industry, such as inclusive 
minutes, quantity discounts, discounts to special numbers, etc. (although it does not 
include handset subsidies). However, this richness of information comes at the cost of 
having data for only the two biggest operators of every country at each point in time. 
This reduces the variability and can make identification of our variables of interest 
harder. Moreover, examining a decade long of consumer behaviour in such a dynamic 
industry such as the telecommunications industry, would perhaps call into question the 
stability of the customer profiles throughout the whole period. Indeed, Teligen adjusted 
the calling profiles of its customers, first set in 2002, in 2006, and then again in 2010 and 
in 2012. The 2002 basket includes voice and SMS for a consumer profile that is most 
representative in 2002. The 2006 and 2010 baskets again includes voice and SMS, but 
for updated consumer profiles that are most representative in 2006 and 2010, 
respectively. Finally, the 2012 basket also includes data. We will focus our main 
analysis on the 2006-2014 period, where we allow the basket to change in 2010 and 
2012 (hence the tariffs include data in the last subperiod). Nevertheless, we have 
considered an extensive sensitivity analysis, such as keeping the 2006 basket fixed 
throughout the entire period, or considering the entire period with various basket 
definitions. This gave robust conclusions, as we discuss in Sections 6 and 7. 
3.1.2. Market structure and investments  
The second main dataset is the quarterly information taken from the Global Wireless 
Matrix of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset (henceforth, BoAML). BoAML 
reports a wealth of data, namely: 
Market structure: number of mobile network operators, and total number of 
subscribers per operator. From the latter, we can compute market shares, as well as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration, which is the sum of the squares of 
market shares. As in other studies, the HHI is based on the installed base of subscribers, 
i.e., the stock of previous and recently acquired customers. Some information on 
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operators’ recently acquired customers is available. But this information is incomplete, 
and the HHI based on the entire stock of customers is a better proxy for the overall level 
of market competition.  
Our market structure variables are based on the traditional mobile network operators 
(MNOs), i.e., those operators who obtained a licence to use the spectrum. In recent 
years, MNOs started to provide access to their network by so-called mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs). These operators only compete at the retail level, and their 
overall impact on competition has been subject to debate. We do not have information 
on the number of MVNOs or their market shares. If such information becomes available 
systematically, it would be interesting to investigate how they have influenced the 
impact of the recent mergers between MNOs.  
Finally, the dataset also reports the time when the entry license was granted to each 
operator. We also compute indicators of cumulative entry in each market, that is, the 
cumulative number of entrants since 2000, and similarly for cumulative exit. 
Financial indicators: BoAML compiles quarterly basic operating metrics for mobile 
operators in over fifty countries. For our purposes, we use, first and foremost, capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), that is, money invested by an operator to acquire or upgrade 
fixed, physical, non-consumable assets, such as cell sites or equipment. This is going to 
be our proxy for investments. We will also use, at times, earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), which is a good accounting metric for 
operators’ profits, as well as EBITDA margins, which are informative about the 
profitability of an operator expressed as a percentage of revenues (hence forming an 
accounting proxy for the Lerner index). Finally, we also look at the quarterly reported 
average revenue per user (ARPU), as this is often mentioned in the policy debate. Note 
that, contrary to the Teligen dataset, the BoAML dataset in principle contains 
information for all operators in a given country.  
Finally, we also collected information on GDP per capita and population in each 
country and period. 
 
3.1.3. Mobile termination rates  
Mobile operators charge other network operators (fixed or mobile) for connecting calls 
to their subscribers – the so called mobile termination rates (MTRs). Using mainly 
Cullen International, but also various other industry and regulatory publications, we 
were in a position to identify the level of MTRs both before and after its regulation, and 
to identify the dates in which MTR regulation was introduced across countries and 
operators.9 
The final dataset comprises 33 countries and more than 7,000 observations for the 
period 2002-2014.10 Table 1 provides some key summary statistics for the main 
                                                          
9 All consumer prices, termination rates and data from financial accounts were converted to euros using the Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the OECD to ease comparability. 
10 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK. 
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variables. The top panel shows the summary statistics for the price data set, for the entire 
period 2002-2014 (first three columns), and for the period 2006-2014 (last three 
columns). The bottom panel shows the analogue summary statistics for the investment 
data set. Our analysis focuses on the period 2006-2014, while we also consider the entire 
period in the robustness section. Note that both samples contain the same set of countries 
and quarters, but the samples sizes differ because the unit of observation within a 
country/quarter differs: for prices, the unit of observation is the usage type for the largest 
two operators, while for investment it is simply the operator. As a result, the number of 
observations is larger for the price data than for the investment data.11 
According to the top panel of Table 1, the average price (or bill) of a basket during 
2006-2014 was 565 euro per year, with a standard deviation of 3,328 euro. This reflects 
variation across countries and over time, but also variation between the three user 
profiles (low = 179, medium = 498 and high = 1018 euros per year) of the two largest 
operators for which we have information. The average number of competitors during this 
period was 3.6, where 34.3% of the observations refer to markets with 4 competitors and 
7.8% to markets with 5 or more competitors (and the remaining 57.9% referring the 
markets with 2, or much more frequently 3, competitors). The HHI was on average 
0.359 on a 0 to 1 scale (or 3,590 on the common 0 to 10,000 scale). Finally, we report 
information on control variables such as GDP per capita (on average 41,182 euros per 
year), the mobile termination rate (on average 0.087 euros per minute) and the difference 
in the MTRs of the least regulated operator and the most regulated operator in each 
country and period (on average 0.301). 
According to the bottom panel of Table 1, investment per operator (CAPEX) had a 
quarterly average of $165 million post-2005, compared with average profits (EBITDA) 
of $386 million, with considerable variation between operators, across countries and 
over time. Operator EBITDA margins were on average 34.9% and monthly average 
revenue per user (ARPU) was $32.8. The information on the control variables is 
comparable to what we reported for our price analysis in the top panel of Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
3.2. Market developments  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of mobile tariffs (overall and by consumer profile) during 
2006Q1-2014Q1, using normalized (at the beginning of the period) demeaned average 
prices across countries and operators. Overall prices steadily declined by almost 50% 
during this period, amounting to an average decline of 2.2% per quarter. Prices by 
consumer profile followed a similar pattern with prices for the large bundles falling 
faster than those for the smaller ones. 
 
                                                          
11 For the investment data before 2006, the information on the operators is less complete, which also attributes to the lower 
number of observations compared to the price data. 
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[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the demeaned average investment (CAPEX), profits 
(EBITDA and EBITDA margin) and average revenue per user (ARPU) across countries 
and operators. Investment (CAPEX) has gradually increased (with seasonal peaks in the 
last quarter of each year). Profits (EBITDA) increased by about 25% until 2011Q3, but 
then started to decline again to eventually reach the same level as in the first quarter of 
our data. This may be due to a gradual decline in average revenue per user across the 
period, insufficiently compensated by a growth in the number of subscribers as markets 
matured. Finally, notice that average percentage EBITDA margins remained fairly stable 
across the period. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
 
Table 2 shows the evolution of the number of competing operators across the countries 
in our data set. In most countries there are three firms, but there is considerable variation 
across countries and over time. Because of new firm entry, no country is left with only 
two operators. At the same time there has been exit through mergers that has reduced the 
number of countries with five operators. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
These trends illustrate that there have been considerable changes in our main variables 
of interest: tariffs, investment and the number of competitors. This variation is not just 
limited to the time dimension; it is also present at the country and operator level, as our 
summary statistics in Table 1 suggests. This provides the necessary information to study 
the impact of market structure on prices and investments. Nevertheless, we should be 
cautious in accounting for general trends (or fluctuations), as we are interested in 
identifying the impact of market structure over and above any historical trends. We 
discuss how we do this in the next section, where we introduce our empirical framework. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
We adopt a panel data approach with fixed effects for countries and time periods, and 
instrumental variables for remaining endogeneity regarding the market structure 
variable. We first outline the specifications for prices and investment (section 4.1), and 
then provide a more detailed motivation where we address possible endogeneity issues 
(section 4.2). 
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4.1. Specification 
For our empirical analysis on prices, we estimate the following equation: 
 
(1)   lnPuoct = αuoc + αt + β1Mkt_Strct + β2Charuoct + εuoct. 
 
The dependent variable in eq. (1) is the logarithm of (euros PPP adjusted) retail prices 
(lnPuoct) paid by a customer with the usage profile u = {low, medium, high} and 
subscribing to mobile operator o in country c in quarter t. Time fixed effects (αt) and 
usage-operator-country fixed effects (αuoc) control for global trends and for time-
invariant usage-operator-country characteristics, respectively. The vector Charuoct 
includes several control variables that may influence prices and vary across tariffs, 
operators or countries. Specifically, we include a dummy variable for whether the tariff 
is post-paid (instead of pre-paid), the logarithm of GDP per capita, the logarithm of the 
mobile termination rate to account for a possible “waterbed effect” of regulation, and the 
logarithm of the mobile terminate rate interacted with a time trend to account for a 
possible declining effect as fixed-to-mobile calls have decreased in importance over time 
(Genakos and Valletti, 2011, 2015). The main variable of interest, Mkt_Strct, is an 
indicator of the market structure in country c in quarter t. In particular, we use two 
alternative indicators of market structure: the number of operators, Nct, and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHIct, in country c in quarter t. 
We estimate the model in first-differences to eliminate the large set of usage-operator-
country fixed effects (αuoc). While a within-transformation would achieve the same 
purpose, the first-difference approach is more appropriate here because of the presence 
of serial correlation in the error terms εuoct. Estimated standard errors are clustered at the 
usage-operator-country level. 
Note that when our market structure variable refers to discrete events (number of 
firms), our empirical model can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator, 
allowing for different control groups at different points in time (similar to recent 
retrospective merger studies, e.g., Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weinberg (2013 and 
2015)).12 In the special case of a panel with only two countries and two time periods, our 
model simplifies to a standard difference-in-differences estimator, where one estimates 
the effect of a change in market structure in one country relative to a control country 
where no change occurred. Our panel data model with multiple periods and countries 
can also be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator, with some additional 
structure to identify the effects (by allowing for different control groups at different 
points in time). In particular, the information for multiple periods enables us to account 
for the possibility of country-specific trends, as in Card (1992) or Besley and Burgess 
(2004) or as discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2009). We will consider this in an 
extension of our analysis. 
                                                          
12 When our market structure variable is a continuous variable (Herfindahl-Hirschman index), such an interpretation is no 
longer literally possible. 
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When we turn to the analysis on operator investment, we estimate the following 
equation: 
 
(2)   lnCAPEXoct = αc + αt + β1Mkt_Strct + β2Op_Charoct + εoct, 
 
where the dependent variable is now the logarithm of Capex of mobile operator o in 
country c in quarter t. We include time fixed effects (αt) to account for general trends 
and especially seasonal effects, and country fixed effects (αc) to account for systematic 
differences between countries. The vector Op_Charoct includes several variables that may 
affect investment and that may vary across operators and/or time. First, we include 
dummy variables for the order of entry (first, second and third entrant relative to the 
remaining operators).13 Second, we include a variable to indicate the time since the 
operator first entered. These variables capture the fact that first-movers who are in the 
market for a long time may have different incentives to invest than late movers which 
entered more recently. Third, we include the logarithm of GDP per capita.14 We estimate 
the model using fixed effects (and not first-differences) because Capex is most often 
lumpy and not serially correlated (although it does show seasonal variation, for which 
we control). We also considered a dynamic specification as in Grajek and Röller (2009), 
but the lagged variables were insignificant. Estimated standard errors are clustered at the 
country-operator level. 
We also present results for alternative measures of the outcome of interest in eq. (2). 
First, instead of investment in absolute terms we consider investment relative to the total 
market size (CAPEXoct divided by the total number of subscribers). This may better 
capture the fact that investment needs increase with market size (even though we already 
control for country fixed effects). Second, we replace investment (CAPEXoct) in eq. (2) 
by alternative performance measures EBITDAoct, (EBITDA margin)oct, and ARPUoct, 
respectively. 
Finally, we also consider an analysis of total industry investment at the country level, 
based on the following specification: 
 
(3)   lnTOTCAPEXct = αc + αt + β1Mkt_Strct + β2Mkt_Charct + εct, 
 
The dependent variable is now the logarithm of total industry Capex across all mobile 
operators in country c in quarter t. Since Capex is not observed for some operators, we 
adjusted total industry Capex by dividing by the total market share of the operators for 
which we have Capex information. We again include time fixed effects (αt) and country 
fixed effects (αc). The vector Mkt_Charct includes the logarithm of GDP per capita and 
the logarithm of population (as measures of potential market size). As for the operator 
                                                          
13 We could in principle also include these variables in the price regression, but we did not do this since we only observe prices 
for the two largest operators. 
14 We also considered a richer specification with operator and country fixed effects αoc, but these additional interaction effects 
are not jointly significant. Similarly, we considered including the mobile termination rate (and trend interaction), and these 
effects were not significant. Since we had not clear a priori expectations on the role of these additional variables, we therefore 
focus on a more parsimonious specification without these variables. 
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investment equation, we estimate the model using a within transformation (fixed 
effects). Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the country level. 
We also considered alternative measures of industry performance outcomes at the 
country level, where we replace TOTCAPEXct in (3) by TOTEBITDAct (again adjusted 
by the market share) and total mobile subscription penetration. 
4.2. Possible endogeneity concerns 
Our empirical framework includes a full set of country and time fixed effects. The 
country fixed effects control for country-specific factors that may be responsible for 
systematically higher prices or higher investment in certain countries. Hence, we identify 
the impact of market structure on prices and investment from changes that occur within a 
country, and assume that the timing of new entry or merger is not correlated with the 
error term. As discussed above, when we use the number of operators as our market 
structure variable, we essentially have a difference-in-differences approach, which 
considers the impact of a change in market structure in the treatment countries, relative 
to the control countries, on performance (prices and investment). A potential concern is 
that there may be remaining endogeneity regarding the market structure variables, 
despite the inclusion of a full set of country and time fixed effects. This concern is 
especially relevant when we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, instead of the number 
of firms, as our market structure proxy. We discuss both in turn. 
 
4.2.1. Number of firms 
The mobile industry is not a free-entry industry. Rather, operators must be awarded 
spectrum licenses, and when a merger or an exit occurs, new operators still need to 
obtain licenses. 
A big source of variation in the number of licence holders in the data comes in 
particular from the award of third generation (3G) licences in the early 2000s. Spectrum 
is typically assigned in a two-step process. First, spectrum is allocated for a certain use 
(e.g., broadcasting, mobile, or satellite); second, licences are assigned to operators. The 
first step is most relevant for our purposes, as it determines how many licenses are 
granted in each country. Börgers and Dustmann (2003) consider the first allocation step 
in the context of the European 3G auctions. They discuss how EU countries were 
constrained by binding decisions made by the International Telecommunication Union 
and by the EU, so that each country had to allocate a fixed amount of spectrum for 
mobile 3G services (60 MHz of paired spectrum and 25 MHz of unpaired spectrum). 
The assignment also had to be conducted in a certain timeframe. The amount of 
spectrum implied that between 4 and 5 licences could be assigned. What is relevant for 
our purposes is that the status quo in the various countries was very heterogeneous, with 
some countries having only two 2G licence holders (Luxembourg), and other countries 
having already five 2G licence holders (the Netherlands). In all these countries, the 
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country-specific timing at which these licenses were granted differed, because of 
idiosyncrasies in the assignment process. Similarly, when mergers started to take place 
in more recent years, there were differences in the timing of these events. 
Börgers and Dustmann (2003) also argue that the determinants of the number of 
licences did not appear to be correlated with particular market characteristics, as it was 
affected by a wealth of political decisions as well as by idiosyncratic events that seemed 
largely random. For instance, the Swedish government (with three 2G incumbents) 
decided to award licences in a beauty contest. It first announced officially that it would 
issue five licences, but then reduced them down to four. By contrast, the UK (with four 
incumbents) chose auctions from the start, making four licences available at first, and 
then increasing them to five. The objectives pursued by governments were not clear, as 
was not also the direction in which operators would want to influence the political 
decisions. Government’s choices over spectrum allocations are a fascinating topic that 
would deserve further investigation. For our purposes, we emphasise that there is no 
evidence of particular patterns that are related to mobile prices or investments. This is in 
favour of our assumption of exogeneity of the number of operators in a market, 
conditional on the full set of country and time fixed effects that we include in our 
specification.15 
Our specification is however still subject to criticism on two grounds. First, the 
variable Nct changes both because of new entry and because of mergers, and it is 
possible that the impact is asymmetric. In recognition of this issue, in the empirical 
analysis we will treat differently changes in market structure due to entry that typically 
reduce concentration from those due to mergers that increase concentration. 
Second, Nct in practice takes a limited number of values (see Table 2), which makes 
the effects harder to identify. For this reason, we also use a second indicator of market 
structure, HHIct, which shows considerably more variation, especially some very useful 
within-country variation. This variable will require instruments, since it can no longer be 
treated as exogenous conditional on the fixed effects. 
4.2.2. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
The HHI is a flexible indicator of market structure but suffers from endogeneity 
concerns, as market shares depend on prices and on investments. To account for this 
endogeneity, we follow an instrumental variable approach. As such, our framework is 
also closely related to a recent paper by Blake et al. (2015), who investigate the 
relationship between advertising and sales using time and region fixed effects and an 
additional instrument for advertising. 
First, we use the difference in the MTRs of the least regulated operator and the most 
regulated operator in country c in period t (MTR_Diffct). MTRs are the payments that an 
operator has to face when it wants to terminate a call off-net, that is, on a rival’s 
                                                          
15 Some studies have found that the number of operators depends on the political and regulatory system, see Duso and Röller 
(2003) and Duso (2005). We could in principle use such variables as instruments. However, in our setting they are likely to 
have limited identifying power because they change little over time and we have already included a full set of country fixed 
effects. 
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network. These charges are also known as two-way access charges in the literature that 
started with seminal contributions of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998). If left 
unregulated, every operator would have a unilateral incentive to monopolise the 
termination of calls it receives. Hence regulators world-wide have intervened repeatedly 
in the market for call termination. These interventions have differed widely, both within 
and between countries, a source of variation we can exploit in our search of a valid 
instrument.16 
We take advantage not only of the different timing of the introduction of regulation 
across countries, but also of the widespread variation on the rates imposed across 
operators within countries. This variation in regulated MTRs was particularly evident in 
countries where there was a large asymmetry between the “large” incumbents and the 
“small” entrants. In practice, regulators have been more reluctant in cutting the MTRs of 
the new entrants. They did this, most likely, with the idea of helping them secure a 
stronger position in the market. Thus, while the level of MTRs may affect prices (and 
which we therefore do not use as an exclusion restriction), the difference in MTRs 
between the most and least regulated operator should not directly affect prices 
(especially not those of the large incumbent operators that are reported in the Teligen 
price dataset). However, one may expect that the difference in MTRs should boost the 
market shares of the smaller operators and hence reduce the HHI. In sum, the difference 
in regulated MTRs does not have a direct impact on prices (given that the level of MTRs 
is included as an explanatory variable), but it may have an indirect impact through the 
HHI. This is also confirmed by a theoretical literature than has looked directly into the 
asymmetric regulation of MTRs, whereby the regulation of the entrant would be more 
lenient than the regulation of incumbents, causing the entrant to capture a larger market 
share in this fashion (Peitz, 2005). 
Second, following the logic of the previous sub-section: (i) we use binary indicators for 
the number of competitors to take advantage of the regulated nature of entry and exit in 
this industry, and (ii) we use two separate variables to measure separately cumulative 
entry and exit of operators in each country to proxy the differential impact of entry and 
exit in market concentration.  
 
                                                          
16 Regulatory intervention over MTRs does not occur randomly either, but is the outcome of a long regulatory and political 
process. However, as reported by Genakos and Valletti (2011 and 2015), this process regarding MTRs has been driven in 
practice by legal and institutional aspects. The UK has been at the forefront and already started regulating MTRs back in 1997. 
Other countries followed suit. Importantly, the European Commission introduced a New Regulatory Framework for electronic 
communications in 2002. The Commission defined mobile termination as a relevant market. Procedurally, every Member State 
is obliged to conduct a market analysis of that market and, to the extent that market failures were found, remedies would have 
to be introduced. Indeed, all the countries that completed the analysis did find problems without exception, and imposed 
(differential) cuts to MTRs (typically, substantial cuts to incumbents and either no cut or only mild cuts to entrants). Hence, the 
timing of the introduction of regulated MTRs, but also the severity with which they were imposed across mobile operators, has 
been driven by this regulatory process and varied widely across countries with no systematic pattern. 
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5. MAIN RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the main results on the effects on prices (subsection 5.1) and 
investment (subsection 5.2). In the next section we report the results of a detailed 
robustness analysis, including alternative performance measures. 
5.1. Price results 
Table 3 shows the results from estimating the price equation (1), for alternative measures 
of market structure. These results are based on the sample of prices for all countries in 
our dataset post-2005, where we allow for varying baskets to account for changes in user 
profiles (such as an increased use of data in recent years): the 2006 basket for the period 
2006-2009, the 2010 basket for the period 2010-2011 and the 2012 basket for the period 
2012-2014. 
Column 1 uses the number of competitors as a measure of market structure. The results 
show that one more competitor leads to a price reduction of approximately 8.6%. 
However, this specification is restrictive since it assumes the same percentage effect as 
the number of operators’ increases, irrespective of the total number of competitors. 
Column 2 allows the effect of the number of entrants to vary non-parametrically. This 
shows that prices decrease by about 15.9% in markets with four operators compared 
with the comparison group of two or three operators. In markets with five or more 
operators, prices are reduced by 7.9% with a new entry, but the effect is estimated rather 
imprecisely (standard error of 6.3%). Column 3 allows for asymmetric effects of entry 
and exit, using variables that measure the cumulative net entry or cumulative net exit 
since 2000. Cumulative entry is typically related to new licenses being awarded, while 
exit is typically associated with mergers. Results in column 3 show that a net entry 
reduces prices by about 9.3%, whereas a net exit increases prices by only 4.3% (with 
significance at the 10% level). One possible interpretation of this finding is that exit due 
to a merger mainly occurs between smaller firms, whereas entry may gradually result in 
a new, larger firm, who may price aggressively to acquire market share. An additional 
possible explanation of this asymmetric effect is that mergers are scrutinised and 
approved by authorities, who may impose pro-competitive remedies to clear the mergers. 
The previous results are informative, but they do not account well for the impact of 
entry and mergers of different sizes. Accounting for different sizes is particularly 
interesting to evaluate the effects of specific mergers. For this reason, the last two 
columns show the effects of increases in concentration based on the HHI index. As 
discussed, we account for the endogeneity of the HHI using the difference between the 
highest and lowest mobile termination rate (MTR_Diffct) as an instrument. In addition, 
in column 4 we use binary indicators for the number of competitors, whereas in column 
5 we use the cumulative entry and exit variables as additional instruments. First stage 
coefficients, presented in the Appendix (Table A1, columns 1 and 2), all have the 
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expected sign and the instruments are very powerful: the F-test on the excluded 
instruments is above 30 in column 4 and above 50 in column 5 of Table 3.  
Both specifications show that an increase in the HHI has a positive and significant 
impact on prices: 2.037 in column 4, and 2.529 in column 5.17 To illustrate, according to 
the first case in column 4, an increase in the HHI by 10 percentage points (for example 
from 0.3 to 0.4) would increase prices by 20.37%. Similarly, a 4-to-3 merger in a 
symmetric industry (raising the HHI by 8 percentage points from 0.25 to 0.33), would 
increase prices by 16.3%.18 This is an average effect based on the sample of all countries 
post-2005. While this effect is statistically significant, it has a relatively wide 90% 
confidence interval, between 7.9% and 24.7%. This may reflect the fact that the merger 
effects depend on specific circumstances in a country at a certain point in time.19 How 
important is this effect against the background of the general price drop of 47% over the 
same period of eight years? Given that the price trend is -2.2% per quarter, a 
hypothetical merger that increases the HHI by 10 percentage points is roughly equivalent 
to going back to the price level of about 8 or 9 quarters ago. 
The rest of the control variables in Table 3 are in line with expectations. First, the pre-
paid dummy is not significant, indicating that the impact of market structure on post-
paid and pre-paid prices is on average equivalent. This is not surprising since Teligen 
selects the best possible prices across pre and post-paid contracts within each user 
profile. Second, changes in GDP per capita over time and across countries do not have a 
significant impact on prices over and above possible effects from systematic cross-
country variation. Again this is to be expected given the extensive set of country-
operator-usage and time control variables. Third, the mobile termination rates have a 
significant effect on prices, though this effect declines over time.20 These findings are 
consistent with recent findings of Genakos and Valletti (2015): they also find a 
significant but declining waterbed effect, which they attribute to a fundamental change 
in the telecoms market. While in the early years, most calls to mobile phones would be 
made from fixed lines, more recently mobile voice traffic has overtaken fixed line call 
volumes, changing the economic forces that give rise to the waterbed effect. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
                                                          
17 When we do not account for the endogeneity of the HHI, the estimated impact is smaller: the OLS estimate of the HHI 
coefficient reduces to only 1.22 (still statistically significant). This is consistent with expectations (e.g., Demsetz, 1973). 
Without accounting for endogeneity a high concentration also reflects the fact that some firms are more efficient implying a 
downward bias in the coefficient. 
18 If one were to compute the post-merger HHI using fixed pre-merger market shares (as in the US merger guidelines to define 
filters), a symmetric 4-to-3 merger would raise the HHI from 2500 (0.25) to 3750 (0.375), or an increase by 12.5 percentage 
points. With such a change in HHI, our model would predict a price increase of 25.5%. 
19 Note that the estimated merger impact is of a comparable order of magnitude for our different market structure measures 
(number of competitors; entry or exit; and HHI). This indicates that it is difficult to empirically distinguish between the impact 
of HHI due to merger, and the impact of HHI due to other reasons. It would be interesting to further explore this distinction in 
future research. 
20
 For example, in the fourth regression (column 4) the mobile termination rate coefficient is 0.201, saying that a 1% 
increase in the mobile termination rate in the first quarter of 2006 led to a price increase of 0.201%. Because of the negative 
trend effect (-0.00451), the effect declined to an insignificant 0.0612 in the last quarter of 2013 (0.201-31*0.00451). 
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5.2. Investment results 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating the investment equation (2) at the operator 
level, for alternative measures of market structure. As for our price analysis, these results 
are based on the sample of all countries in our dataset post-2005. According to column 1, 
each additional competitor reduces investment per operator by about 10.7%. The impact 
of entry may depend on the number of entrants. As column 2 shows, in markets with 
four operators, investment per operator is 18.3% lower than in the comparison group of 
markets with two or three operators. Furthermore, in markets with five or more 
operators, investment per operator is 25.3%, or an additional 7%, lower. Column 3 
shows that a new entrant has a stronger negative effect on investment than the positive 
effect on investment associated with exit, though the effects are estimated imprecisely. 
The last two columns of Table 4 show the results based on the HHI measure of 
concentration. The results from the first stage regression of the HHI on our instruments 
(shown in Table A1, columns 3 and 4, in the Appendix) are comparable to what we 
found before (though not identical since the two samples differ somewhat). An increase 
in the HHI by 10 percentage points raises investment per operator by 24.1% using the 
first instrument set (column 4) and by 27.9% using the second instrument set (column 5). 
In both cases, the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Perhaps more 
concretely, a 4-to-3 merger in a symmetric industry (raising the HHI by 8 percentage 
points) would raise investment per operator by about 19.3% (under the first instrument 
set). This suggests that increases in concentration involve a trade-off: on the one hand 
operators in more concentrated markets raise prices, but on the other hand, they also 
increase investments. 
The control variables show that the order of entry matters to some extent, as the first, 
second and third entrants invest more than the comparison group (fourth and fifth 
entrants). The effects are, however, only significant at the 10% level, and there do not 
appear to be significant differences between the first three entrants. Similarly, the time 
since first entry does not seem to affect investment levels. GDP per capita has a 
significant and strong, nearly proportional effect on investment. For example, based on 
the results in column 4, an increase in GDP per capita by 1% raises the investment of an 
operator by 0.89%. 
From a policy perspective it is also interesting to evaluate the investment at the 
country level. To do so we aggregate investment at the country level weighting it by 
each operator market share to account for the fact that we do not have data on several, 
mainly small operators. This considerably reduces the size of our dataset and the 
aggregation also eliminates all the across mobile operators variability, leaving only the 
across country variation. Table 5 reports the results. GDP per capita is estimated to 
increase total industry investment, consistent with our earlier finding on investment per 
operator. Market size has a negative effect, suggesting some economies of scale, but its 
effect is not significant most likely due to limited variation of population over time. 
Regarding the main variables of interest, the first three measures of competition 
suggest that there is a negative effect of entry on total investment, but the effect is not 
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statistically significant. According to our last measure, the HHI index, there is a positive 
relation between concentration and industry investment, but again the effect is estimated 
imprecisely (columns 4 and 5).21 The imprecise estimates may be due to the fact that 
investment is a noisier variable than prices, but also due to the reliance on cross country 
variability only. Further research on more detailed investment or network quality and 
performance measures may give more conclusive results. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that theoretical work has shown that an increase in concentration would lead 
to a decrease in total industry investment in the absence of efficiencies (Vives, 2008; 
Motta and Tarantino, 2016). Hence, our finding that concentration has no effect on 
industry investment suggests that there may at least be fixed cost savings, and possibly 
benefits to consumers from coordinating investment among fewer firms. 
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 around here] 
5.3. Merger effects in specific cases 
To better understand the economic significance of our previous findings we consider 
what the model predicts for three actual mergers that took place in Europe during our 
sample. In particular, we consider two mergers from 4 to 3 in Austria and the 
Netherlands that materialized in 2013 and 2007 respectively, and a merger from 5 to 4 in 
the UK in 2010. Table 6 provides various market details about the three mergers as well 
as our calculations for the predicted price and investment effects in these cases. Since the 
three considered mergers are all European and took place after 2005, we base the 
calculations on the estimates of a specification which is identical to eq. (1) and eq. (2) 
but includes only the European countries after 2005 (see Tables A2, column 5 and Table 
A7, column 3, discussed in detail in the next section). 
In Austria, the mobile operator Orange (with a market share of 19%) sold its business 
to 3-Hutchinson (with a market share of 11%). This resulted in an increase in the HHI by 
6.4% points. The model predicts that this leads to a price increase by 6.6% and an 
increase in investment per operator by 13.3%, though in both cases the 90% confidence 
intervals support the possibility of only a small increase, or fairly large increases up to 
12.2% and 25.5%, respectively. In the UK, the 5 to 4 merger between T-Mobile and 
Orange had a comparable impact on the HHI (+6.9% points), so that the predicted price 
and investment increases are comparable to those in Austria, +6.9% and 13.9% 
respectively. Finally, in the Netherlands the merger between the same firms had a lower 
impact on the HHI (+3.6% points), so that the predicted impact is about half as large as 
in the other two countries, + 3.7% on prices and +7.5% on investment.22 
                                                          
21 First stage results are reported in Table A1, columns 5 and 6, in the Appendix. 
22 Note that, when operator-level market shares remain constant after the merger, the HHI would increase by 2 times the 
product of the market shares of the both merging firms (so by 4.2% in Austria, +3.6% in the Netherlands and +8.4% in the UK, 
based on the market shares in Table 6). In practice, market shares can however decrease or increase after a merger (depending 
on market power and efficiencies), so it is better to look at the actual change in the HHI. It is worth noting that, compared with 
the constant market share HHI increase, the actual change in the HHI was larger in Austria, about equal in the Netherlands, and 
smaller in the UK. 
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In principle, we could compare these predicted merger effects with the actual effects. 
However, simply calculating average prices in affected countries before and after the 
event would not provide a meaningful comparison as it would not take into consideration 
the underlying, unrelated to mergers, trends affecting both prices and investment. To 
accurately estimate the merger effect we would need to construct a case-specific control 
group for each country and take an appropriate time window around the event so that it 
is not affected by any other changes in market structure. Instead of doing this on each 
merger event separately, here we use the entire panel to identify and quantify the effects. 
It is interesting to note that a recent study by Aguzzoni et al. (2015), which follows this 
methodology and looks at the merger between T-Mobile and Orange in the Netherlands 
in 2007, estimates a 10%-17% increase in prices.23 To further understand heterogeneity 
in market structure effects, it would be interesting to see more case studies in future 
research, perhaps also using alternative methods such as structural approaches. In Box 1 
we describe how the entry of Free in the French market has affected tcompetition. 
 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
BOX 1. The effect of entry on price – The case of Free in the French market 
 
In principle, our model may be used to assess the impact of entry in specific cases. A 
prominent recent case has been the entry by Free as the fourth operator in the French 
market. In practice, our model does not seem suitable to assess this case, because the entry 
of Free had effects that go beyond the traditional pre-paid and post-paid prices of the largest 
two operators (which is what we based our econometric analysis on). As such, the impact of 
this fourth operator was more disruptive than the impact of the third operator, Bouygues, 
which was introduced many years earlier. 
 
Free started its commercial launch in the French market in January 2012. It introduced 
contract-free post-paid tariff plans, much different from the traditional post-paid plans 
which came with at least an annual contractual commitment. Free offered these plans at low 
prices, and the three incumbents did not respond in the traditional way, by lowering the 
prices of their current brands. Instead, they introduced entirely new brands (Sosh by Orange, 
RED by SFR and B&You by Bouygues), which were contract free, similar to Free’s offer. 
The incumbents in fact introduced these new brands slightly before the launch of Free, but 
once Free entered, they further reduced the prices of these new brands.  
 
In ongoing work, Bourreau, Sun and Verboven (2016) investigate this case, using data on 
market shares and prices of all operators. Their preliminary evidence indicates that the entry 
of Free does not have a strong impact on the prices of the incumbents’ brands (consistent 
                                                          
23 However, it should be noted that some results become insignificant or inconclusive after controlling for country-specific 
trends indicating that it cannot be excluded that the price increase “was enhanced or even partly caused by other factors 
affecting the market, beyond the T-Mobile/Orange merger”, like the merger KPN/Telfort consummated about 2 years earlier. 
This was not the case under our panel data approach, as discussed in the robustness analysis below (Table A5). 
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with our reduced form model). However, the prices of Free and the three “fighting brands” 
are much lower, and consumers thus mainly gain through this channel. 
 
END OF BOX. 
6. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS 
We now discuss the results from several robustness checks and extensions. 
6.1. Price results 
We considered the robustness of our price analysis with respect to several assumptions. 
First, we considered how the results are affected when we vary the sample. To do so 
we use our IV specification with the HHI as the indicator of market structure. Column 1 
of Table A2 in the Appendix simply reproduces the result from column 4 in Table 3 to 
ease comparisons. In column 2 we consider the whole sample available (2002-2014). 
This shows that the HHI still has a significant impact over the entire period, but the 
magnitude is smaller. To further explore this, we also broke down the period 2006-2014 
into two subperiods: before and after 2010 (columns 3 and 4). This confirms that the 
impact of competition is smaller during 2006-2009 (HHI coefficient of 0.821) than 
during 2010-2014 (HHI coefficient of 4.812, though with a larger standard error and 
only significant at the 10% significance level). The higher impact of competition on 
prices during the later years is consistent with our earlier discussion of the French case, 
where the third entrant Bouygues was much less disruptive than the fourth entrant Free 
(see Box 1). One interpretation is that late entrants in mature markets need to be more 
aggressive to compete and obtain market shares than early entrants, who can still target 
new consumers without a subscription. Another interpretation for the increased impact 
of competition on prices may be the more common practice of quadruple play, whereby 
operators bundle a broadband package (internet, fixed line and TV) with a mobile 
subscription).  
In the last two columns of Table A2, we restrict the sample to only European countries, 
either for the post-2005 (column 5) or for the entire period (column 6). A comparison 
with columns 1 and 2 shows that the estimated coefficients are slightly smaller for 
Europe only, but remain positive and significant. 
Second, we considered the robustness of the results when we used fixed instead of 
varying baskets. The advantage of a fixed basket is that we use the same bundle of 
characteristics (combination of minutes, text, etc.) throughout the entire period, so that 
price comparisons over time are more transparent. The disadvantage is, however, that the 
basket may become less representative, especially in recent years when consumers may 
have shifted their behaviour towards more data consumption. Results are shown in Table 
A3 (for the whole sample) and in Table A4 (for Europe only) in the Appendix again 
using the IV specification with the HHI market structure indicator. In sum, the positive 
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impact that market concentration has on prices holds both with fixed and with varying 
baskets. Accounting for varying baskets tends to result in somewhat larger price effects 
of increased concentration. This suggests that the price effects mainly manifest 
themselves in increased prices for data services rather than voice services. 
Third, to account for simple dynamics we also considered a specification with one-
period lags for the market structure variables (with suitable lagged instruments in the IV 
specification with the HHI). We find that the coefficient of the lagged variable is 
statistically insignificant and also reduces the precision of the main estimate somewhat, 
so we prefer a simple specification with price adjustment within the same quarter.24 
Fourth, we extended the analysis to allow prices to follow country-specific linear 
trends (as opposed to the parallel trend assumption we made with the set of common 
time fixed effects). The results are reported in Table A5 in Appendix. This shows that 
the results are very close to those reported earlier in Table 3.25 Finally, we consider an 
extension of our main analysis in allowing the effects of increased concentration to differ 
between different user profiles: low, medium and high. This robustness exercise is of 
particular policy interest as, after the recent Austrian merger, the concern was raised that 
the consumers most vulnerable to mergers would be low users.26 Table 7 presents the 
results. The impact of the HHI is the smallest for consumers with a low usage, and it is 
largest for consumers with a high usage. This seems to indicate that mergers or entry 
especially affects the high users. However, when taking into account the rather large 
standard deviations due to the reduced sample sizes, these differences are not statistically 
significant, so that one can conclude that different user profiles are not affected 
differentially by changes in market concentration. Also note that the role of the control 
variables remains broadly similar to what we found in our main results in Table 3. In a 
similar spirit, we also run separate regressions for pre-paid and post-paid prices. In the 
first case, contract length and incentives to offer discounts through handset subsidies 
play no role. We find robust results for both contract types, but standard errors become 
considerably larger because of the reduced number of observations.  
 
 [Insert Table 7 around here] 
6.2. Investment results 
We also considered the robustness of our investment analysis with respect to several 
assumptions. First, we replace absolute investment measure (CAPEXoct) by an 
investment measure relative to the total market size (CAPEXoct divided by total number 
of subscribers). The results, shown in Table A6, are totally comparable to those obtained 
                                                          
24 Results not reported here, available on request. 
25 We also performed an “initial conditions” test, whereby we examined the first quarter of our data and compared prices or 
investment (CAPEX) for the group of countries that will experience a merger/exit (or entry) to the group of countries that will 
not see any such change. We found no statistically significant difference for either prices or investment, again indicating the 
quasi-random nature of these events across countries. 
26 See, for instance, “Austrian data raise red flags for UK telecoms merger”, Financial Times, 16/03/2016 (available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e536751e-e9fc-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4.html#axzz48pw6m9yJ). 
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earlier (Table 4). The impact of the market structure variables is actually slightly 
stronger and more significant 
Second, we considered how the results change for alternative samples. We conducted 
both the analysis of investment per operator (Table A7 in the Appendix), and the 
analysis of total industry investment (Table A8 in the Appendix). As before, we consider 
the whole sample available (column 2) and the restricted sample of only European 
countries either for the post-2005 (column 3) or for the entire period (column 4). The 
estimated effects of the HHI on investment become less precisely estimated when we 
consider all years, or when we consider only European countries. The magnitude of the 
HHI effect is also lower when we consider the whole period. This indicates that 
concentration has especially raised investment in more recent years, which may reflect 
the strong investment needs with the roll-out of the 4G/LTE networks. 
Third, we considered heterogeneity across countries, in particular the role of being a 
mobile operator who is also active on fixed-line telecom markets. This may create 
synergies and some investment expenditures may benefit both the mobile and fixed-line 
consumers. We found that being also a fixed telecom operator raises investment 
(significance at the 10%) level, but does not imply a different HHI effect (no significant 
interaction term).27 
As with the price analysis, we also considered a dynamic specification with one-period 
lags for the market structure variable. This is potentially more relevant for investment 
than for prices, as investment is more sluggish to adjust. However, we find that the effect 
of the lagged variable is insignificant and also implies an imprecise estimate for the 
effect of the market structure variable in the current period. This suggests that the data 
make it hard to identify the dynamics over time, even if such dynamics may be present. 
As a further robustness check, we omitted the current market structure variable and only 
included the one-period lagged variable. In this specification, the lagged effects are very 
close to the effects found in the model without lags. We conclude that the impact of 
increased concentration on investment may not be immediate, but the precise response 
length is difficult to identify from the existing data.28 
We note that it would be interesting in further research to perform an analysis 
regarding the role of network-sharing arrangements that are becoming popular in the 
industry. This could best be assessed through in-depth case studies. In Box 2 we describe 
how network sharing agreements in the UK played a role in a recent merger assessment. 
 
BOX 2. Investment and network-sharing in the UK market 
 
Mobile network sharing agreements play an important role in the mobile 
telecommunications sector. In the United Kingdom, there are two main network sharing 
agreements. First, MBNL is a 50/50 joint venture between Three and the recently 
merged British Telecom (BT)/Everything Everywhere (EE). MBNL provides a shared 
                                                          
27 We also considered interaction effects of the HHI with other operator characteristics (order and timing of entry), after also 
suitably adding interactions with our instruments. We do not find significant interaction effects in our sample. 
28 Results not reported here, available on request. 
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site portfolio which supports both shared (3G) and non-shared (2G/3G/4G) technologies 
used by Three and BT/EE. Second, the so called "Beacon" agreements between O2 and 
Vodafone comprise (i) a 50/50 joint venture between O2 and Vodafone, providing a 
shared site portfolio, and (ii) a contractual arrangement which provides shared 
2G/3G/4G technologies used by O2 and Vodafone.  
 
In 2016, the European Commission blocked a proposed merger between Three and O2 in 
the UK. The Commission was not only concerned about potential price increases due to 
the loss of competition, but also feared that the future development of the shared UK 
mobile network infrastructure would be hampered. On the latter point, the Commission 
found that the merged entity would have less of an interest to engage in network sharing 
which in turn could weaken the competitive position of Vodafone and BT/EE.  
 
The Commission also assessed the claims by Hutchison that the integration of the 
networks of Three and O2 would result in a number of benefits. However, the 
Commission found that these claimed efficiencies were uncertain to materialise. Even if 
they did, they would only have started to materialise a few years after the merger and 
taken even longer to be realised in full. Therefore, the Commission could not conclude 
that the claimed efficiencies would be able to outweigh the harm to consumers, which 
would have materialised immediately after the merger as a result of the loss in 
competition in the market.29 
 
END OF BOX. 
 
6.3. Impact of market structure on other performance measures 
As an addition to the price and investment analysis, we also considered other 
performance measures available from the same data source at the level of the operators. 
For the analysis of performance per operator we considered the following performance 
measures: the impact on profits (EBITDA), on percentage profit margins (EBITDA 
margin) and on average price per user (ARPU). For the analysis of industry performance 
we considered total industry profits and total market penetration (subscribers as a 
percentage of total population). We also checked how the results for industry investment 
and industry profits change when we do not adjust the measure by total market size. 
Table 8 shows the results for the performance per operator. We consider the period 
post 2005. Results can be summarized as follows: 
• Profits (EBITDA) per operator (column 2): Both the order of entry and the time 
since entry have a significant and positive impact on profits. Furthermore, an increase 
in the HHI by 10 percentage points significantly raises profits per operator by 48.1% 
                                                          
29 Case M.7612, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7612. 
The case is under appeal at the time of this writing. 
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(column 2), whereas investment per operator increases by 24.1% (column 1), and vice 
versa for a decrease in the HHI by 10 percentage points. 
• EBITDA profit margin (column 3): The order of entry matters, with the first 
entrant obtaining the highest profit margin, followed by the second and third entrant. 
An increase in concentration by 10 percentage points raises the profit margin by 5.37 
percentage points. This increase in profit margin is consistent with our findings in the 
price analysis, but it can also be in part due to efficiencies from increased investment. 
• Average revenue per user (ARPU; column 4): No operator-specific variables have 
a significant impact on this performance measure. Furthermore, the HHI does not have 
a significant impact either. 
We should note that the EBITDA margin can simply be rewritten as (Average 
revenues – Average costs)/Average revenues = 1 – ACPU/ARPU, where ACPU denotes 
the average cost per user. Since we find that ARPU does not change with concentration, 
while EBITDA increases, this suggests that concentration should decrease the average 
cost per user, which can be interpreted as an efficiency defence of mergers. 
Table 9 shows the results for industry performance at the country level. Again, we 
consider the period post 2005. Results can be summarized as follows: 
• Industry investment (columns 1 and 2): When we adjust the missing observations 
on investment by the market share, the estimated impact of a 10% increase in the HHI 
on industry investment is estimated to be 11.96% but insignificant, compared to 
30.88% (significant at the 10% level) when we do not adjust. 
• Industry profits (columns 3 and 4): Similarly, an increase in the HHI does not have 
a significant impact on the adjusted measure of industry profits, where it has a 
significant positive impact on the unadjusted measure. 
• Market penetration (column 5): An increase in the HHI does not have a significant 
effect on the number of mobile users, possibly reflecting the finding that the mobile 
industry is quite mature with inelastic demand at the industry level. 
 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 around here] 
 
7. DISCUSSION AND CAVEATS 
This study is driven by data availability and has some limitations that we wish to discuss 
in this section. 
We start with our metrics for prices. We used the Teligen basket methodology, which 
identifies the cheapest tariff for different usage profiles. An advantage of this approach 
is that it provides a clear and undisputed measure for what a certain customer would pay. 
That is, Teligen obtains a measure for the customer bill, with many details that are 
practically relevant and accounted for (e.g., distribution of calls, SMS, data downloads, 
and so forth). This raises the question, however, of how representative the hypothetical 
bill identified by Teligen is compared to the actual bill paid by customers. Customers in 
different countries may have different mobile usage attitudes: to the extent that these are 
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time invariant, or that they change proportionally over time in the various countries, our 
(country-operator-usage, as well as time) fixed effects would capture such differences, 
and therefore we included them in our analysis. If instead there are variations that are 
time and country specific, then our results could be biased – though the direction of bias 
is not clear a priori. We also note that we used both fixed baskets, as well as time-
varying baskets, and we did not find qualitative differences, which should be reassuring 
for the robustness of our findings. 
An alternative to the basket approach would be to look at aggregated revenues, such as 
ARPU. But we would argue that these measures, which are sometimes used in other 
studies, are not very meaningful. This is for two reasons. First, by definition, ARPU 
relates to total revenues per subscriber. These revenues also include revenues for 
incoming calls, which are not paid by a given subscriber but by calling subscribers from 
other networks. Hence this is not related to the customer bill, but it is closer to a measure 
of profitability. Second, total revenues per subscriber depend also on the usage made by 
the subscriber for a given price, so ARPU may be large also because the allowance of a 
given price is large. In other words, changes in ARPU may reflect changes in the 
composition of consumption rather than real price changes. It is of no surprise that, when 
analysing ARPU directly, we found that it has no clear relationship with market 
structure. We therefore conclude that ARPU, which may be monitored perhaps to 
provide a view on profitability, is not an interesting variable to study when looking at the 
impact on subscriber prices. In itself, this is also an interesting finding of our analysis. 
One could make a step further by constructing “average” prices, that is, ARPU 
(excluding termination revenues) adjusted for some measure of quantity and quality. 
Some imperfect measures of usage exist, but they are always related to voice services, 
while almost nothing is available over time and across countries for data. Hence it is 
very difficult to revert to average pricing measures in an exercise, like ours, involving a 
large panel with many operators and several years of observations, where data 
comparability is a strong driver of the empirical strategy. The basket approach ultimately 
is the only one that allows consistent comparisons. An alternative, of course, is to 
renounce a panel approach and to concentrate on country-specific studies with all the 
details that could be gathered at the country level, but not internationally. 
Another limitation of the basket approach is that, given the data intensive exercise to 
find the cheapest price in every quarter among the universe of available offers, Teligen 
supplies information only for the two largest operators in every country/period. The 
implication of this, given that it is rare that the largest operators are involved in a 
merger, is that we may underestimate the impact of a merger. The largest operators, to 
the extent that they are outsiders to a merger, will have an indirect (strategic) effect to 
increase prices when competing in strategic complements. This effect is typically 
smaller than the (direct) effect of merging operators who internalise their pricing 
choices. Keeping this remark in mind, we also point to our analysis on EBITDA 
margins, which comes from a different dataset (BoAML): while this analysis is only 
indirectly related to prices, it does however look at all operators, and produces findings 
that are in line with the price results. 
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Both our price and our investment analysis produce average results across time and 
countries. It would be interesting to try to distinguish in more accurate ways between the 
impact that entry or exit might have when related to smaller or to larger firms, or to 
“pure” mobile operators as opposed to those integrated with fixed line operations. 
Similarly, one could collect more data on operator characteristics, such as public 
ownership or multi-market presence.  
Also, as discussed earlier, our analysis lacks data on mobile virtual network operators 
(MVNOs) because these are not available in any consistent way over time and across 
countries. We used the available data as collected in the BoAML dataset, but this does 
not keep track of MVNO information in a systematic way. We do not expect that 
MVNO entry is systematically correlated with the merger events, conditional on our 
time and country fixed effects. Hence, this would not affect our main results on the 
impact of mergers on prices. Furthermore, while MVNOs might be offering the best 
available contracts for low-usage consumers after they enter, they have relatively small 
market shares, and they may offer lower service quality. We therefore think that our 
approach, to take a fixed basket of the two largest MNOs, is justifiable. Nevertheless, in 
future research it would be interesting to study the separate impact of MVNOs, which 
may be most relevant in the low usage segment. The best advice for an analysis of 
MVNOs is probably to conduct a narrower but deeper analysis at the country level. We 
also note that MVNOs are also proposed as possible remedies to recent mergers, and that 
mergers are themselves endogenous and not randomly allocated. A similar remark 
applies also to other remedies, such as network sharing. The best we could do in our data 
was to distinguish between net entry (likely to be related to licensing) and net exit (likely 
to be related to mergers). We pointed above to the asymmetric effects on prices and 
investments due to entry/exit, which is a transparent and parsimonious way to describe 
the differences in the mechanisms and outcomes. 
Our analysis did not consider the role of financial constraints. Financial constraints 
may influence market structure, and they may also directly influence the decision to 
make investments. While we have financial indicators such as EBITDA in our dataset, 
we have treated them as endogenous. As an alternative, we considered the role of short-
term interest rates. This variable does not enter significantly in our model, and does not 
affect our main results. Future research should consider the role of operator-specific 
financial constraints more thoroughly, with suitable instruments that explain the 
evolution of these constraints. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analysed the impact of market structure on prices and investments 
in the mobile telecommunications industry. We have conducted an empirical study using 
a panel of 33 OECD countries over the period 2002-2014. We have collected detailed 
information at the level of individual mobile network operators, assembling what is, to 
our knowledge, the largest dataset employed to-date for works of this kind. 
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We find that, during the analysed period, when mobile markets became more 
concentrated, prices increased to end users with respect to the case in which no 
concentration happened (absolute prices actually decreased in all cases during the 
analysed period). At the same time, capital expenditures increased. These results are 
robust to various perturbations and remain significant even when we control for 
unobserved heterogeneity using panel data techniques and when we address market 
structure endogeneity using different instrumental variables. At the country level, we 
found an insignificant effect of market structure on total industry investments, which is 
possibly influenced by the smaller sample size and reduced variability (across country 
instead of across country and operator variation). Nevertheless, as we have already 
pointed out, theoretical work has shown that an increase in concentration would lead to a 
decrease in total industry investment in the absence of efficiencies. Hence, our finding 
that concentration has no effect on industry investment suggests that efficiencies from 
coordinating investment among fewer firms are present. An obvious possibility is that 
there are fixed cost savings, because fewer firms avoid duplicating the same fixed costs. 
Such savings can be welfare improving, but do not benefit consumers. A second 
possibility is that there are economies of scope or spill-overs that generate marginal cost 
savings or quality improvements to the benefit of consumers. 
The effects refer to average effects on past changes in market structure, which are 
significant but also with margin of error, and the past results do not necessarily apply to 
future mergers. Keeping this caveat in mind, our results are significant not only 
statistically but also economically. A hypothetical average 4-to-3 symmetric merger in 
our data would have increased the bill of end users by 16.3%, while at the same time 
capital expenditure would have gone up by 19.3% at the operator level, always in 
comparison with what would happen in the case of no merger. More realistic asymmetric 
4-to-3 mergers (between smaller firms in European countries) are predicted to have 
increased the bill by about 4-7%, while increasing capital expenditure per operator by 
between 7.5-14%. 
To our knowledge, it is the first time that the dual impact of market structure on prices 
and investments has been assessed and found to be very relevant in mobile 
communications, both from an economic and from a statistical point of view. Our 
findings are therefore of utmost importance for competition authorities, who face a 
trade-off when confronted with an average merger similar to one captured in our sample. 
Ceteris paribus, a merger will have static price effects to the detriment of consumers, but 
also dynamic benefits for consumers to the extent that investments enhance their demand 
for services. 
In European merger control, merging parties face tough hurdles when putting forward 
an efficiency defence and, as such, it remains questionable whether efficiencies will ever 
play an important role in decisions under the EC Merger Regulation in any but the most 
exceptional cases. However, this is not to say that advisers should abandon enquiries 
about the rationale for mergers or any anticipated efficiency gains. In practice, though, 
the main pay-off from an understanding of the expected efficiencies arising from a 
horizontal merger is likely to be the insights this gives about the nature of competitive 
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rivalry in an industry, which in turn will assist in gathering evidence on market dynamics 
and likely supply-side responses. Such evidence should not be an after-thought. It 
deserves a central role in a unilateral effects assessment that justifies a departure from 
the constraints imposed by simple theoretical static models. 
An open question that our study raises, but cannot answer due to data limitations, is an 
assessment of the impact of investments on consumer surplus. Capital expenditures, our 
measure for investments, refer to all the money spent to acquire or upgrade physical 
assets. This could be related to cell sites, which improve coverage and/or speed, both of 
which would be enjoyed by consumers. Understanding where the extra investment 
money goes when a market gets more concentrated is an inescapable question to 
properly assess the consequences of mergers in mobile telecommunications markets. The 
missing link, which we hope will be further researched by operators, competition 
authorities and scholars alike, is the understanding of the consumer benefits that arise as 
a consequence of operators’ investments. 
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FIGURE 1: PRICE EVOLUTION OF MOBILE TARIFFS, 2006Q1-2014Q1 (2006Q1=100)
Notes: The figure presents information on the normalised (at the beginning of 2006) PPP-adjusted demeaned average prices (total bill paid) across countries for all tariffs (overall) and
for each consumer profile separately (low, medium, high).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter across 33 countries.
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FIGURE 2: EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT (CAPEX), PROFITS (EBITDA), PROFIT MARGINS (EBITDA MARGIN) AND 
REVENUES (ARPU), 2006Q1-2014Q1 (2006Q1=100)
Notes: The figure presents information on the normalised (at the beginning of the period) PPP-adjusted demeaned average CAPEX, EBITDA, EBITDA margin and ARPU across
countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on accounting information from the Global Wireless Matrix of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BoAML) dataset.
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Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Mobile tariff price (Puoct) 7789 559.7 2760.7 5329 564.7 3328.2
Mobile tariff price (low user profile) 2598 186.780 78.997 1778 178.8 84.4
Mobile tariff price (medium user profile) 2596 504.701 1906.1 1776 497.6 2301.7
Mobile tariff price (high user profile) 2595 987.977 4349.1 1775 1018.4 5253.6
Number of competitors (Nct) 7378 3.556 0.925 5002 3.558 0.830
Four competitors dummy 7789 0.293 0.455 5329 0.343 0.475
Five+ competitors dummy 7789 0.113 0.317 5329 0.078 0.268
Cumulative entry 7378 0.382 0.536 5002 0.419 0.548
Cumulative exit 7378 0.298 0.607 5002 0.383 0.686
HHI 7330 0.371 0.078 5002 0.359 0.065
Pre-paid dummy 7789 0.349 0.477 5329 0.360 0.480
GDP per capita 7510 37803.0 20813.9 5134 41181.8 21964.2
Mobile Termination Rate 6679 0.105 0.068 4930 0.087 0.058
MTR_Diffct 6760 0.502 2.595 4930 0.301 1.436
CAPEXoct 2573 159.6 257.6 2345 164.9 267.0
EBITDAoct 3004 376.5 545.1 2715 386.1 560.2
EBITDA marginoct 4666 0.321 0.237 2704 0.349 0.221
ARPUoct 4994 35.205 62.213 2875 32.793 81.086
Number of competitors (Nct) 5049 3.805 1.013 2903 3.725 0.866
Four competitors dummy 5049 0.361 0.480 2903 0.429 0.495
Five+ competitors dummy 5049 0.188 0.391 2903 0.118 0.323
Cumulative entry 5049 0.317 0.481 2903 0.372 0.483
Cumulative exit 5049 0.297 0.597 2903 0.454 0.711
HHI 5049 0.361 0.077 2903 0.349 0.069
GDP per capita 4793 33782.4 16886.1 2761 39335.5 17791.8
Mobile Termination Rate 3922 0.123 0.089 2495 0.084 0.064
MTR_Diffct 3957 0.444 2.325 2495 0.317 1.443
Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset (2006-2014)
TABLE 1 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Teligen dataset (2006-2014)Teligen dataset (2002-2014)
Bank of America Merrill Lynch dataset (2002-2014)
Notes: The above table provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Tables 3-9 based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter, the BoAML dataset and the
matched MTRs. The unit of observation in the Teligen dataset is at the country-operator-usage profile level, whereasint the BoAML dataset it is at the country-operator level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen, Cullen and BoAML matched datasets.
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Period 2002Q2 2006Q1 2010Q1 2014Q1
Number of 
countries
Number of 
countries
Number of 
countries
Number of 
countries
2 competitors 3 3
3 competitors 14 14 16 18
4 competitors 7 7 10 13
5 competitors 3 3 1 1
6 competitors 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 28 28 28 33
TABLE 2 - COUNTRIES AND COMPETITORS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FD FD FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.0855***
(0.0290)
Four competitors -0.159***
(0.0425)
Five+ competitors -0.0785
(0.0629)
Cumulative entry -0.0934*
(0.0488)
Cumulative exit 0.0432*
(0.0248)
HHI 2.037*** 2.529**
(0.637) (1.148)
Pre-paidjct 0.0338 0.0360 0.0344 0.0337 0.0337
(0.0543) (0.0537) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0543)
Log GDP per capita -0.0153 -0.0845 -0.0199 -0.0142 -0.0110
(0.213) (0.180) (0.213) (0.216) (0.216)
ln(MTR)oct 0.192*** 0.168*** 0.194*** 0.201*** 0.201***
(0.0693) (0.0553) (0.0689) (0.0685) (0.0689)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00449** -0.00403*** -0.00451** -0.00484*** -0.00486***
(0.00182) (0.00139) (0.00181) (0.00179) (0.00179)
Constant -0.066 -0.052 -0.056** -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.050) (0.077) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.302
First stage F-test 33.25 51.49
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 4,682 4,550 4,550 4,550
R2 0.788 0.787 0.788 0.788 0.787
Clusters 192 192 192 192 192
TABLE 3 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.107**
(0.0416)
Four competitors -0.183***
(0.0612)
Five+ competitors -0.253**
(0.120)
Cumulative entry -0.110
(0.0695)
Cumulative exit 0.0560
(0.0541)
HHI 2.410** 2.786**
(1.164) (1.204)
Time since entryoct 0.0199 0.0204 0.0197 0.0120 0.0124
(0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0223) (0.0203) (0.0203)
First entrant 0.676* 0.661* 0.681* 0.584* 0.577*
(0.349) (0.350) (0.351) (0.301) (0.300)
Second entrant 0.535* 0.521* 0.539* 0.344 0.339
(0.300) (0.301) (0.301) (0.259) (0.259)
Third entrant 0.496* 0.484* 0.501* 0.353 0.348
(0.268) (0.270) (0.268) (0.226) (0.225)
Log GDP per capita 0.673** 0.631** 0.728*** 0.888*** 0.894***
(0.264) (0.270) (0.261) (0.275) (0.279)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.476
First stage F-test 252.24 65.38
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,073 2,073
R2 0.173 0.174 0.173 0.139 0.137
Clusters 78 78 78 75 75
TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S INVESTMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPEX of mobile operator o in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors
clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.0358
(0.0439)
Four competitors -0.0594
(0.0672)
Five+ competitors -0.0877
(0.0872)
Cumulative entry -0.0558
(0.0950)
Cumulative exit 0.0179
(0.0525)
HHI 1.196 1.457
(1.592) (1.240)
Log GDP per capita 0.559* 0.546 0.573* 0.625* 0.630*
(0.335) (0.335) (0.321) (0.377) (0.381)
Log Population -0.103 -0.107 -0.104 -0.124 -0.128*
(0.0755) (0.0792) (0.0762) (0.0772) (0.0768)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.542 0.408
First stage F-test 70.81 11.82
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 720 720 720 618 618
R2 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.022 0.018
Clusters 27 27 27 24 24
TABLE 5 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON INDUSTRY INVESTMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the market share adjusted CAPEX in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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Country
Time of merger
Type of merger
Buyer
     Market share buyer
Seller
     Market share seller
HHI before
HHI after
Change in HHI
Predicted change in price
     90% confidence interval 1.0% 12.2% 0.6% 6.8% 1.1% 12.7%
Predicted change in investment
     90% confidence interval 1.2% 25.5% 0.7% 14.3% 1.2% 26.5%
T-Mobile
Orange
21%
20%19%
11%
Orange Orange
6.6% 3.7% 6.9%
13.3% 7.5% 13.9%
5 to 4
0.291
0.355
0.064
0.347
0.383
0.036
0.221
0.288
0.067
4 to 3 4 to 3
T-Mobile
15%
12%
3 (Hutchison)
TABLE 6 - PREDICTED MERGER EFFECTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
Austria Netherlands UK
2013Q1 2007Q4 2010Q2
Notes: Counterfactual calculations based on three recent actual mergers in Europe.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the estimated coefficients from Table A2, column 5 and from Table A7, column 3.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket
Usage profile Low Medium High Pre-paid Post-paid
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
HHI 1.751* 2.142* 2.246* 1.336 1.650***
(0.904) (1.172) (1.182) (1.026) (0.636)
Pre-paidjct -0.00264 0.0466 0.119
(0.0281) (0.0927) (0.157)
Log GDP per capita 0.0614 -0.0933 -0.0455 1.043** -0.555**
(0.230) (0.263) (0.456) (0.464) (0.220)
ln(MTR)oct 0.0720 0.233* 0.340*** 0.542*** -0.0507
(0.105) (0.119) (0.112) (0.155) (0.126)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.000615 -0.00736** -0.00785*** -0.00942*** 0.000190
(0.00297) (0.00312) (0.00295) (0.00365) (0.00290)
Constant -0.0193 -0.113*** -0.225*** -0.103** -0.102***
(0.0377) (0.0304) (0.0515) (0.0422) (0.0301)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.479 0.495
First stage F-test 10.35 10.96 11.01 18919 25.01
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,520 1,516 1,514 1,542 3,008
R2 0.916 0.791 0.741 0.749 0.810
Clusters 64 64 64 156 180
TABLE 7 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - DIFFERENT USAGE AND CONTRACT TYPES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXoct lnEBITDAoct EBITDA Marginoct lnARPUoct
Countries All All All All
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
HHI 2.410** 4.809*** 0.537** 0.115
(1.164) (1.531) (0.267) (0.627)
Time since entryoct 0.0120 0.0481* 0.00285 0.0124
(0.0203) (0.0286) (0.00372) (0.00896)
First entrant 0.584* 2.017*** 0.224*** -0.107
(0.301) (0.437) (0.0471) (0.0875)
Second entrant 0.344 1.753*** 0.198*** 0.0203
(0.259) (0.385) (0.0398) (0.0711)
Third entrant 0.353 1.524*** 0.162*** -0.0805
(0.226) (0.334) (0.0348) (0.0546)
Log GDP per capita 0.888*** 0.789** 0.0423 0.293***
(0.275) (0.361) (0.0513) (0.100)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.613 0.614 0.612
First stage F-test 252.24 309.02 307.69 311.34
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,073 2,231 2,221 2,338
R2 0.139 0.596 0.371 0.051
Clusters 75 80 79 81
TABLE 8 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S PERFORMANCE - 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Notes: The dependent variable varies by column as indicated in row 3. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered
at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXct - adjusted lnCAPEXct - unadjusted lnEBITDAct - adjusted lnEBITDAct - unadjusted lnSubscribersct
Countries All All All All All
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
HHI 1.196 3.088* 0.537 2.519*** 0.441
(1.592) (1.859) (0.787) (0.680) (0.485)
Log GDP per capita 0.625* 0.852** 0.267 0.494* 0.280
(0.377) (0.408) (0.307) (0.282) (0.197)
Log Population -0.124 -0.0904 -0.0715* -0.0395 -0.0207
(0.0772) (0.0878) (0.0418) (0.0360) (0.0220)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, Binary 
indicators for the number 
of competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.559 0.559
First stage F-test 70.81 70.81 70.81 72.14 72.14
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 618 618 618 624 624
R2 0.022 0.023 0.010 0.042 0.065
Clusters 24 24 24 24 24
TABLE 9 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE - ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Notes: The dependent variable varies by column as indicated in row 3. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis below
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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1 
Appendix 
In this Appendix we provide the first-stage results and we discuss the results of several 
robustness checks of our results that we conducted. 
Table A1 shows the first stage regression results of our various instrumental variables 
regressions for prices, operator’s investment and industry investment (corresponding to 
specifications (3) and (4) of, respectively, Table 3, 4 and 5 in the text.  
 
[Insert Table A1 around here] 
 
The next tables show the results of several robustness checks. First, we consider how the 
price results are affected when we increase the sample to the entire period available, or 
when we restrict the sample to only European countries, which constitute a more 
homogeneous group of countries. For simplicity, we focus only on the results based on 
the HHI measure of concentration, using the first instrument set that, based on the previous 
results, is somewhat more conservative. Table A2 presents the results. Compared with the 
sample of all countries post-2005 (column 1) the estimated effect of the HHI drops to 
1.399 (column 2), when we consider the full sample (since 2002). Furthermore, the 
estimated effect of the HHI is also lower for the sample of European countries (it decreases 
to 1.028 in column 3 in the sample post-2005 and to 0.827 in the full sample in column 
4). The estimated effect remains significant at the 10% level or higher. 
 
[Insert Table A2 around here] 
 
Second, we considered how the results change when we used fixed baskets instead of 
varying baskets over the period. Table A3 shows the results of this exercise. The first two 
columns repeat our previous results where we allow for varying baskets (for the HHI 
measure of competition with the first instrument set), both for the sample post-2005 and 
for the full sample. The next two columns show the results when we use the 2002 basket 
throughout the entire period, again both for the sample post-2005 and for the full sample. 
The advantage of a fixed basket is that we use the same price proxy throughout the entire 
period. The disadvantage is, however, that the basket may become less representative, 
especially in recent years when consumers may have shifted their behaviour towards more 
data consumption. The estimated impact of the HHI becomes lower in this model. For the 
sample post-2005, an increase in the HHI by 10% is now estimated to increase prices by 
a statistically significant 12.93% (column 3), compared to the 20.37% estimate we 
obtained before using the varying baskets price measure. A similar finding holds when we 
use the whole sample since 2002, where the estimated effect of the 10% increase in the 
HHI is now 10.48% (column 4) compared to 13.99% under the varying basket measure 
(column 2). Finally, the last column reports the results when we use the 2006 basket (for 
the period post-2005). This again shows a lower estimate of the HHI: a 10% increase in 
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the HHI raises prices by 16.28% (column 5) compared with 20.37% under the varying 
basket measure (column 1). 
As a further robustness analysis, we repeated this analysis for the sample of European 
countries only. This shows a similar picture, as summarized in Table A4: the estimated 
price effects from increased concentration tend to become smaller if we used fixed baskets 
for 2002 and 2006, but they remain statistically significant. 
 
[Insert Tables A3 and A4 around here] 
 
Finally, in Table A5 we re-estimate the same specifications as in Table 3, but now we 
also allow for country-specific linear trends. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
very similar to those reported in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table A5 around here] 
 
We now turn to the robustness of our investment analysis. First, we replicate the results 
in Table 4 by replacing the absolute investment measure (CAPEXoct) by an investment 
measure relative to the total market size (CAPEXoct divided by total number of 
subscribers). The results, shown in Table A6, are qualitatively totally comparable to those 
obtained earlier (Table 4), while the impact of the market structure variables is actually 
slightly stronger and more significant. 
Second, we considered how the results change for alternative samples: longer period, 
restriction to European countries. As before, we only present the robustness analysis for 
the results of our specification with the HHI measure of competition (first instrument set).  
Table A7 shows the results for the analysis of investment per operator. In column 1, for 
ease of comparison, we report the earlier obtained results for the main sample (period post 
2005, all countries, shown in Table 5, column 4). According to Table A7, the estimated 
effect of the HHI on investment per operator becomes lower when we consider all years, 
or when we consider only European countries. However, using the entire sample is less 
appropriate since the investment information was available for fewer countries in the 
earlier periods. 
Table A8 shows the results for the analysis of total industry investment, that is, the 
results from estimating the investment equation (3) at the country level. The base result in 
column 1 (period post 2005, all countries) shows a positive but not significant impact of 
HHI on investments at the country level. The estimated effect of the HHI on total industry 
investment also becomes lower when we consider all years or only European countries, 
but as before the effect is imprecisely estimated and insignificant.  
 
[Insert Tables A6-A8 around here] 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct
Teligen basket varying basket varying basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Diff MTR indexct (x 103) -0.323*** -0.463*** -1.524*** -1.649*** -1.382*** -1.405***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.269) (0.300) (0.726) (0.763)
Three competitors -0.069*** -0.094*** -0.091***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Four competitors -0.094*** -0.133*** -0.126***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Five competitors -0.118*** -0.199*** -0.180***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.018)
Six competitors -0.116*** -0.137*** -0.130***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.008)
Seven competitors -0.117***
(0.013)
Cumulative entry -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.055***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013)
Cumulative exit 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.302 0.586 0.476 0.542 0.408
First stage F-test 33.25 51.49 252.24 65.38 70.81 11.82
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 4,550 2,073 2,073 618 618
TABLE A1 - FIRST STAGE RESULTS
Notes: The dependent variable varies by column as indicated in row 3. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage
(columns 1-2) or at country-operator (columns 3-4) or country level (columns 5-6) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen, Cullen and BoAML matched datasets.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket Varying basket
Countries All All All All Europe only Europe only
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2009 2010-2016 2006-2014 2002-2014
HHI 2.037*** 1.399*** 0.821** 4.812* 1.028* 0.827**
(0.637) (0.465) (0.355) (2.827) (0.528) (0.375)
Pre-paidoct 0.0337 0.0287 -0.0685*** 0.100 -0.0526** -0.0446**
(0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0251) (0.0871) (0.0212) (0.0185)
Log GDP per capita -0.0142 -0.0227 -0.430** 0.310 0.184 0.144
(0.216) (0.193) (0.208) (0.346) (0.183) (0.164)
ln(MTR)oct 0.201*** 0.177*** 0.215*** 0.117 0.271*** 0.203***
(0.0685) (0.0524) (0.0749) (0.147) (0.0672) (0.0544)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00484*** -0.00411*** -0.00848*** -0.00283 -0.00702*** -0.00527***
(0.00179) (0.00145) (0.00190) (0.00355) (0.00180) (0.00151)
Constant -0.094*** -0.112*** -0.0794*** -0.108*** -0.133*** -0.125***
(0.022) (0.0238) (0.0156) (0.0291) (0.0274) (0.0271)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.194 0.587 0.454 0.585 0.2306
First stage F-test 33.25 42.03 26.66 7190 15927.21 951.12
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 6,044 2,469 2,081 3,632 4,886
R2 0.788 0.782 0.075 0.806 0.895 0.888
Clusters 192 201 156 189 150 156
TABLE A2 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics.
Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket 2002 basket 2002 basket 2006 basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014
HHI 2.037*** 1.399*** 1.293*** 1.048*** 1.628***
(0.637) (0.465) (0.375) (0.351) (0.450)
Pre-paidoct 0.0337 0.0287 -0.0234 -0.0196 -0.00595
(0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0189)
Log GDP per capita -0.0142 -0.0227 -0.309*** -0.281*** -0.241**
(0.216) (0.193) (0.101) (0.0920) (0.115)
ln(MTR)oct 0.201*** 0.177*** 0.235*** 0.197*** 0.0888**
(0.0685) (0.0524) (0.0503) (0.0430) (0.0355)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00484*** -0.00411*** -0.00565*** -0.00459*** -0.00329**
(0.00179) (0.00145) (0.00124) (0.00112) (0.00133)
Constant -0.094*** -0.112*** -0.0357** -0.0315** -0.0257**
(0.022) (0.0238) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0124)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.450 0.194 0.453 0.194 0.455
First stage F-test 33.25 42.03 33.44 41.94 58.58
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 6,044 4,533 6,027 4,590
R2 0.788 0.782 0.094 0.088 0.021
Clusters 192 201 192 201 192
TABLE A3 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - VARYING vs. FIXED BASKETS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket Varying basket Varying basket 2002 basket 2002 basket 2006 basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014
HHI 1.028* 0.827** 0.654** 0.500* 1.009***
(0.528) (0.375) (0.281) (0.299) (0.318)
Pre-paidjct -0.0526** -0.0446** -0.0317* -0.0264* -0.00647
(0.0212) (0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0200)
Log GDP per capita 0.184 0.144 0.0373 0.0133 0.0557
(0.183) (0.164) (0.101) (0.0931) (0.105)
ln(MTR)oct 0.271*** 0.203*** 0.244*** 0.190*** 0.126***
(0.0672) (0.0544) (0.0522) (0.0478) (0.0317)
ln(MTR)oct × time trend -0.00702*** -0.00527*** -0.00600*** -0.00458*** -0.00420***
(0.00180) (0.00151) (0.00134) (0.00127) (0.00125)
Constant -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.0217 -0.0150 -0.0145
(0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0111)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.585 0.231 0.587 0.231 0.594
First stage F-test 15927.21 951.12 15436.07 1018.71 25310.55
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 3,632 4,886 3,591 4,845 3,654
R2 0.895 0.888 0.093 0.086 0.025
Clusters 150 156 150 156 150
TABLE A4 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - VARYING vs. FIXED BASKETS, EUROPE ONLY
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic tests are in
brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FD FD FD IV-FD IV-FD
Dependent variable lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct lnPuoct
Teligen basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket varying basket
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.0807***
(0.0290)
Four competitors -0.138***
(0.0399)
Five+ competitors -0.0557
(0.0607)
Cumulative entry -0.0960**
(0.0464)
Cumulative exit 0.0261
(0.0268)
HHI 2.531*** 2.465**
(0.650) (1.133)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage F-test 26.53 33.74
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 4,550 4,682 4,550 4,550 4,550
R2 0.799 0.798 0.799 0.798 0.798
Clusters 192 192 192 192 192
TABLE A5 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES - COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRENDS
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. P-values for diagnostic
tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE IV-FE IV-FE
Dependent variable ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct) ln(CAPEXoct/subsct)
Time Period 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014
Number of mobile operators -0.131***
(0.0413)
Four competitors -0.205***
(0.0600)
Five+ competitors -0.338***
(0.118)
Cumulative entry -0.131*
(0.0676)
Cumulative exit 0.0832
(0.0519)
HHI 2.704** 3.370***
(1.201) (1.207)
Time since entryoct 0.0210 0.0217 0.0210 0.0143 0.0150
(0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0199) (0.0199)
First entrant 0.663* 0.647* 0.666* 0.559* 0.546*
(0.347) (0.348) (0.349) (0.296) (0.294)
Second entrant 0.526* 0.512* 0.529* 0.327 0.317
(0.299) (0.300) (0.299) (0.256) (0.255)
Third entrant 0.487* 0.474* 0.491* 0.334 0.326
(0.267) (0.269) (0.267) (0.224) (0.222)
Log GDP per capita 0.371 0.337 0.432* 0.604** 0.615**
(0.233) (0.236) (0.227) (0.245) (0.253)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Cumulative entry and 
cumulative exit
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.476
First stage F-test 252.24 65.38
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,073 2,073
R2 0.171 0.172 0.170 0.132 0.129
Clusters 78 78 78 75 75
TABLE A6 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S INVESTMENT RELATIVE TO MARKET SIZE
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPEX of mobile operator o in county c in quarter t relative to the total market size (total number of subscribers). P-values for
diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct lnCAPEXoct
Countries All All Europe only Europe only
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014
HHI 2.410** 1.400* 2.075* 1.119
(1.164) (0.796) (1.149) (0.786)
Time since entryoct 0.0120 0.0123 -0.00232 0.00813
(0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0365) (0.0362)
First entrant 0.584* 0.568* 0.725 0.600
(0.301) (0.290) (0.501) (0.476)
Second entrant 0.344 0.307 0.554 0.405
(0.259) (0.252) (0.429) (0.414)
Third entrant 0.353 0.303 0.416 0.300
(0.226) (0.218) (0.363) (0.343)
Log GDP per capita 0.888*** 0.941*** 1.830*** 1.688***
(0.275) (0.260) (0.356) (0.348)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.586 0.640 0.614 0.672
First stage F-test 252.24 168.70 534.62 500.43
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,073 2,269 1,612 1,789
R2 0.139 0.143 0.161 0.162
Clusters 75 75 59 59
TABLE A7 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON OPERATOR'S INVESTMENT - 
ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPEX of mobile operator o in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets
and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct lnCAPEXct
Countries All All Europe only Europe only
Time Period 2006-2014 2002-2014 2006-2014 2002-2014
HHI 1.196 0.354 -1.362 -1.029*
(1.592) (0.956) (1.425) (0.554)
Log GDP per capita 0.625* 0.726** 1.341*** 1.277***
(0.377) (0.321) (0.289) (0.321)
Log Population -0.124 -0.121* -0.123 -0.126
(0.0772) (0.0715) (0.0926) (0.0911)
Instrumental Variables
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators 
for the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
Diff MTR  indexct, 
Binary indicators for 
the number of 
competitors
First stage partial R2 of excl. IVs 0.542 0.621 0.523 0.652
First stage F-test 70.81 38.38 330.54 125.00
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 618 671 467 514
R2 0.022 0.032 0.140 0.130
Clusters 24 24 18 18
TABLE A8 - THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON INDUSTRY INVESTMENT -             
ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the market share adjusted CAPEX in county c in quarter t. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets
and italics. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on quarterly accounting information obtained from the BoAML dataset.
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